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Note
The Corporate Receipt Conundrum: Establishing

Access in Copyright Infringement Actions
Stacy Brown
A struggling songwriter' sends a tape of her music to a record company with the hope of obtaining a contract. The company returns the tape to her, accompanied by a letter of
rejection. She later hears a song on the radio by an artist
under contract to the same record company that sounds remarkably like the one she submitted. She sues the company
for copyright infringement, claiming that an employee had the
opportunity to copy her work during the time that the company
possessed the tape. Employees of the company submit affidavits denying they saw or heard her tape. Should her suit survive summary judgment?
Unless the two works are strikingly similar,2 a plaintiff3
first must satisfy the threshold question of whether the alleged
infringer 4 had access to her work before reaching the ultimate
claim that the work was, in fact, unlawfully copied.5 To estab1. This hypothetical is not intended to limit the issue to musical copyright infringement, since allegations of copyright infringement occur in many
industries. Scriptwriter, toymaker or clothing designer are only some of the
examples one could substitute for songwriter.
2. Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1403 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (explaining that to be considered striking, the similarities must be "of a
kind that can only be explained by copying, rather than by coincidence, independent creation, or prior common source"); see also i7fra notes 31-32 (discussing substantial similarity in greater detail).
3. This Note will refer to the copyright owner as the plaintiff. Although
it is not necessarily so, this Note will assume that the copyright owner is also
the author of the work that was allegedly copied.
4. In many of the cases to which this Note refers, the named defendants
are the companies that employ the individuals alleged to have infringed the
plaintiffs work, as well as the individuals themselves. See, e.g., Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 972 F.2d 939, 944 (8th Cir. 1992). This Note will attempt to make the distinction between the defendant individual and the
defendant company whenever necessary to avoid confusion.
5. "The fact that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's work and
that the defendant's work is similar to the plaintiff's can form the basis for an
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lish access, the plaintiff must show that the alleged infringer
had a reasonable opportunity to view or copy her work. 6 While
a party moving for summary judgment has an affirmative burden to establish the absence of any triable issue of fact, 7 the
non-moving party, in this case the plaintiff, has the burden of
producing sufficient evidence of access to warrant a trial.8 If
the plaintiff can only produce evidence that the defendant company received her work, most courts will hold that this evidence alone does not create a genuine issue of material fact 9 on
access necessary to survive defendant's summary judgment
motion.
Demonstrating that the alleged infringer had a reasonable
opportunity to copy her work can be the most difficult hurdle a
plaintiff faces when trying to survive summary judgment in
copyright infringement actions,' 0 because it is often impossible
inference that the defendant copied her work from the plaintiff's work."
PAUL GoLDsTEIN, COPYRIGHT:

2

PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.2.1, at 8

(1989). After the plaintiff establishes that the defendant in fact copied from
her work, she must then show that the defendant copied "an improper
amount." Id. § 7.3, at 21.
6. Moore, 972 F.2d at 942; Kamar Int'l v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d
1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 1981); ALAN LATMAN, LATMAN's THE COPYRIGHT LAW 192

(William F. Patry ed., 1986). Although some courts have defined access as the
actual reading or knowledge of plaintiff's work by the alleged infringer, see,
for example, Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 287 F.2d 478, 479 (9th
Cir.), cert dismissed, 368 U.S. 801 (1961), courts rarely use this definition, and
most courts and commentators believe it to be erroneous. See, e.g., 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NImmER, NmMR ON COPYRIGHT § 13.02[A], at 13-

15 (1992) (calling this definition erroneous). "[I]t is clear that even if evidence
is unavailable to prove the fact of actual viewing, if it can be shown that the
defendant had the opportunity to view, this (when combined with substantial
similarity) is sufficient to permit the trier to conclude that copying has occurred." Id.; see also Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 245 F. Supp. 451, 458
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (choosing "opportunity to see" as definition of access over actual viewing), affd, 360 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1966).
7.

1 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

56.3[14], at

529 (2d ed. 1993) (citing Bell v. Cameron Meadows Land Co., 669 F.2d 1278 (9th
Cir. 1982)).
8. See Takeall v. Pepsico, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D. Md. 1992) (granting
defendant's summary judgment motion because the plaintiff was unable to
produce enough evidence of access).
9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ("The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that-there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 56(e) ("an adverse party...
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial").
10. Sanford v. CBS, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 711, 713 (N.D. Ill.
1984) ("The most
important component of this sort of circumstantial evidence [to prove copying]
is proof of access."). But see Todd Shuster, Originality in Computer Pro-
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to produce any direct evidence of access."1 The corporateU receipt doctrine addresses the special difficulty of proof that
arises when the defendant is a business. The most lenient interpretation of this doctrine, called "bare corporate receipt," allows a plaintiff to satisfy her burden as to access merely by
showing that the company employing the alleged infringer received the work. 13 This interpretation of the doctrine, however, is not widely accepted. Instead, to meet the requirements
grams and Expert Systems: Discerningthe Limits of Protectionunder Copyright Laws of France and the United States, 5 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 1, 33 (1992)
("Access to a work apparently is shown easily and, in many cases, admitted by
the defendant.") (citing David Nimmer, Analyzing Substantial Similarity in
Software Infringement Cases, 6 COMPUTER LAW. 17, 17-18 (1980)). Computer
software claims, however, often present a different situation from literary and
artistic claims, because software developers build progressively upon existing
programs. The issue then becomes not whether the defendant had access, but
rather whether she unlawfully appropriated the essential elements of the new
program from past technologies. See Shuster, supra, at 6.
11. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.02[A], at 13-15. The authors
state:
Just as it is virtually impossible to offer direct proof of copying, so it
is often impossible for a plaintiff to offer direct evidence that defendant (or the person who composed defendant's work) actually viewed
or had knowledge of plaintiff's work. Such viewing will ordinarily
have occurred, if at all, in a private office or home outside of the presence of any witnesses available to the plaintiff.
Id.; see also JOHN W. HAZARD, JR., COPYRIGHT LAW IN BuSINESS AND PRACTICE
7.2[3][a] (1989) (noting the difficulty in establishing access in cases where
there has not been wide dissemination of the allegedly infringed work).
Courts have adopted an "opportunity to copy" as the definition of access because of the difficulty of proof. See NImmER & NIMMER, supra note 6,
§ 13.02[A], at 13-15 n.5.
Even if the plaintiff is unable to prove actual viewing by the defendant, but is able to establish the reasonable opportunity to view, this
should be regarded as a showing of "access" for the purposes of shifting the burden to defendant to establish independent creation....
[Tihe burden should likewise shift where the defendant denies that
he ever obtained physical possession although he had a reasonable opportunity to obtain such possession.... [Tihe burden should shift because the plaintiff often can no more prove actual physical possession
than he can, assuming such possession, prove the act of reading and
the memory of such reading.

Id12. The term "corporate" does not necessarily refer to a corporation, but
rather to a business enterprise that employs both the individual with knowledge of plaintiff's work, and the individual accused of copying plaintiff's work.
See Meta-Film Assocs., v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346, 1358 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
(using this terminology to distinguish corporate receipt from the situation in
which the person with knowledge and the alleged infringer have dealings with
one another, but do not share a common employer).
13. See Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 329 F. Supp. 601, 609-10
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (adopting the bare corporate receipt doctrine).
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of corporate receipt, courts have recently held that the plaintiff
must provide additional evidence showing a relationship beat the comtween the employee who received the submission
14
pany and the employee who allegedly copied it.

The difficulty in creating a rule applicable to all corporate
receipt situations lies in the fact that companies vary as to size,
structure, and policies.' 5 Larger and complex organizations
present situations where it is least appropriate to presume that
all employees have an opportunity to view outside submissions.
The same characteristics, however, make it more difficult for
plaintiffs to prove a possible chain of communication from the
recipient to the ultimate user. The converse is true for smaller
companies: fewer employees means less potential difficulty in
showing access, and a greater possibility that the opportunity
for access exists.
This Note considers the extent to which courts should
14. See Meta-Film, 586 F. Supp. at 1355 (adopting the nexus requirement);
see also Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 972 F.2d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 1992)
(same); Glanzmann v. King, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1594, 1596 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
29, 1988) (same), qffd, 887 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1989).
15. In some large corporations, for example, the process of reviewing submissions may require a work to pass through several different departments
before the company ultimately rejects it. See Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker
Bros., 529 F. Supp. 1204, 1208 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), qffd mem., 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.
1982). After the new product manager of Parker Brothers told the plaintiff
that the company had a "degree of interest" in his version of a game, plaintiff's
submission passed through the game development, marketing and costing departments before Parker Brothers ultimately rejected it. Id. In other companies a particular department will automatically receive unsolicited submissions
and will return them to the sender. The plaintiff in Vantage Point also sent
his game to the president of Milton Bradley. Id That company routed the
submission to the president's secretary and then rerouted it to the customer
service department, which returned it. HL The court found this policy sufficiently shielded pertinent company employees from an opportunity to view
plaintiff's work. Id at 1212. Sometimes a plaintiff will address a submission
directly to an employee in a decision-making position. When the company
does not intercept the submission before reaching the employee's secretary, it
becomes even more difficult to determine whether a reasonable possibility of
access was created. See Novak v. National Broadcasting Co., 752 F. Supp. 164,
173 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (upholding policy whereby manuscripts were routed directly to the legal department, but tapes such as plaintiff's went to the addressee's secretary for processing and return). Prior caselaw does not always
provide guidance about how to interpret company policies because many
courts do not discuss the corporation's procedures in detail. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d. 675, 677 (1st Cir. 1967) (stating only
that plaintiff sent his submission to the company and that all "pertinent employees" denied viewing the work); Bevan, 329 F. Supp. at 604 (stating only
that plaintiff addressed his submission to the President of CBS, and a CBS
representative returned it).
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adopt the doctrine of bare corporate receipt in copyright in-

fringement suits. Part I describes the action of copyright infringement, focusing on the issue of access. Part II examines
the body of law that has evolved around the corporate receipt
doctrine. Part III submits that the current approach taken by
courts to limit use of the corporate receipt doctrine to situations
in which the plaintiff can show evidence of a nexus between
the recipient of his work and the alleged infringer places a potentially insurmountable burden on plaintiffs suing large companies for copyright infringement. This Note proposes limiting
use of the bare corporate receipt doctrine to suits in which
plaintiffs cannot obtain enough evidence of access to survive
summary judgment because the size and complex structure of
the defendant company precludes the plaintiff from being able
to show a nexus. In such situations, this Note argues, courts
should allow a showing of bare corporate receipt to shift the
burden of production to the defendant.
I. COPYRIGHT AND THE CORPORATE
RECEIPT DOCTRINE
A.

THE ELEMENTS OF AN INFRINGEMENT ACTION

The Constitution provides that Congress has the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of ... useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their ...
Writings."'16 Copyright law seeks to reward creators for their
efforts and to benefit society by encouraging creative works.' 7
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Through the four revisions of the Copyright Act, Congress has expanded the scope of protection so that it now extends to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression," which includes literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic,
graphic, and audiovisual works, and motion pictures. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
17. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
("[P]rivate motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music and the other arts."); Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind ... copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best
way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors
... .");see also Shuster, supra note 10, at 16 ("[C]opyright law is primarily an
economic mechanism. Courts applying copyright law seek an equilibrium between the needs of creators, who require incentives to be innovative and productive, and the needs of people in society, who benefit most when access to
information, technology and art is unencumbered."). But see Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1290 (1991) ("The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and Useful Arts.' ").

1414

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1409

Copyright law also encourages originality' 8 by protecting the
copyright owner's expression of ideas against infringement. 19
Originality is not defined in the Copyright Act,20 but it means
that the copyrighted work is the result of the author's own creativity and was created independently of other authors'
works.2 1 In copyright infringement actions, courts must often
determine whether the requirement of originality has been
met.
A party claiming infringement must show three things to
prevail in a copyright infringement action:22 that he or she
owned the copyright, 23 that the defendant copied from the
copyright owner's work,24 and that the material copied amounts
18. See Feist Publications,111 S. Ct. at 1287 ("The sine qua non of copyright is originality."); ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT IN A NUT SHELL 290 (2d
ed. 1990) (stating that "[t]he essence of copyright is originality").
19. If a court finds infringement, the copyright holder may seek injunctive and monetary relief, including damages and lost profits. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501506 (1988).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
21. See FeistPublications,111 S. Ct. at 1287 ("Original, as the term is used
in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least
some minimal degree of creativity.").
22. This standard dates back to the 1946 case, Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d
464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). Although the standard for summary judgment used in
this case is now outdated, see infra note 65 and accompanying text, courts still
apply its framework for the elements of infringement. See GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 5, § 7.1, at 3 n.2. ("Although courts today generally apply Arnstein's requirements for proof of infringement, they have generally abandoned Arnstein's standard for summary judgment."); Alan J. Hartnick, Summary
Judgment in Copyright From Cole Porterto Superman, 70 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 53, 70 (1984) ("Even though Arnstein is not 'good law' insofar as
summary judgment is concerned, Arnstein continues to be seminal in framing
the issue of infringement."). The United States Supreme Court recently reformulated the standard to be "(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying
of constituent elements of the work that are original." FeistPublications,111
S. Ct. at 1296. The court made this clarification to emphasize that not all copying is infringement. For example, compilations of facts receive only limited
protection since they include elements that are not original. Id. at 1297.
23. This element is usually established by registration of the copyright,
which is prima facie evidence of ownership. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 6, § 13.01[A], at 13-6 to 13-7. Before 1976, federal statutory copyright protection attached only after publication, and state common law covered those
materials not protected by federal law. The 1976 Copyright Law changed this
requirement by attaching protection as soon as a work is fixed in tangible
form, thereby subsuming common law copyright claims. 17 U.S.C. § 102
(1988); see MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 18, at 281-82.
24. Copying may be conscious, such as if the defendant photocopied a
plaintiffs work or had it in mind when creating his own. See GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 5, § 7.2, at 7. Copying is equally actionable, however, if it is uncon-
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to an unlawful appropriation. 2 5 Absent an admission by the defendant, 2 6 it is virtually impossible to provide direct evidence of
copying.2 7 Therefore, courts allow plaintiffs to prove copying
circumstantially 2s by demonstrating first that the alleged infringer had access to the plaintiff's material, and second, that
the two works are substantially similar.29 Evidence of both acscious, such as if the defendant heard the plaintiff's work at some time, but
then forgot it. Id.
25. This final stage of the analysis is established if "the infringement is
substantial and material enough (either quantitatively or qualitatively)."
LAThiAN, supra note 6, at 196. The plaintiff must prove that at least some of
the elements copied were protectable subject matter. Id There is, therefore,
a distinction between permissible and impermissible copying. MILLER & DAvis, supra note 18, at 339. For example, even if two works are identical, if
both works were copied from a common source which is in the public domain,
the copying is permissible. Michelle V. Francis, Comment, Musical Copyright
Infringement" The Replacement of Arnstein v. Porter-A More Comprehensive Use of Expert Testimony and the Implementation of an "Actual Audience" Test, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 493, 505 n.104 (1990). Only when the plaintiff is
able to establish copying, either through direct evidence or by circumstantial
evidence of access and substantial similarity, does the court proceed to inquire
into whether the copying was illicit. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
26. Defendants sometimes concede access for summary judgment purposes when they feel they can prevail on the issue of substantial similarity.
See Ronald S. Rosen & Douglas C. Fairhurst, Summary Judgment in Copyright, Trademark and Unfair Competition Litigation, available in
WESTLAW, PLI database, at *2 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Liter-

ary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G4-3875, 1991).
27. See Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d. 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that

"copiers are rarely caught red-handed"); Cholvin v. B. & F. Music Co., 253 F.2d
102, 103 (7th Cir. 1958) ("[T]he charge of infringing does not fail merely because the infringer was not caught in the act ....
"); see also HAZARD, supra
note 11, 7.2[4] (noting the "sheer necessity of the theory of access in proving
copying acknowledges that a plaintiff will rarely have direct proof of copying,"
such as would be the case if the plaintiff actually saw the defendant photocopy
the work). In addition, copying may occur without "objective physical manifestation," such as copying from memory. NIMMER & NnMER, supra note 6,
§ 13.01[B], at 13-11. Nor does the defendant have any incentive to remember
the event. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 7.2.1.1, at 10. But see Alan Latman,
"ProbativeSimilarity" as Proofof Copying: Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 CoLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1194 (1990) ("[L]et plaintiff's
counsel neither despair nor overlook the possibility of proving copying directly
....For example, there may be collaborators, co-workers and others who have
in fact observed the producer of defendant's material at work.").
28. See Gaste, 863 F.2d. at 1066 (stating that "copying has traditionally
been proven circumstantially"); see also LATMAN, supra note 5, at 191 (stating
that the plaintiff may prove copying by indirect or circumstantial evidence).
29. For a detailed discussion of substantial similarity, see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03, at 13-27. Professor Latman suggests that the term
"probative similarity" be used in place of "substantial similarity" because "a
similarity, which may or may not be substantial, is probative of copying, if by
definition, it is one that under all the circumstances justifies an inference of
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cess and substantial similarity creates an inference of copying.3 0
In most situations a plaintiff must show both access and
substantial similarity. If the works are so strikingly similar as
to preclude the possibility of coincidence or independent creation,31 some courts will infer that copying occurred,32 thus obviating the need to show access. 33 Only rarely, however, will two
works be strikingly similar; generally plaintiffs must establish
access. 34 If a plaintiff successfully establishes both access and
copying." Latman, supra note 27, at 1190. Latman also suggests use of the
term "probative similarity" when establishing indirect proof of copying because the inquiry should not be confused with the one undertaken later in the
process to determine whether similarities are substantial enough to constitute
unlawful appropriation. LATMAN, supra note 6, at 193. Most courts, however,
continue to use the term "substantial similarity." See, e.g., Moore v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., 972 F.2d 939, 941-42 (8th Cir. 1992); Intersong-USA v. CBS,
Inc., 757 F. Supp. 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
30. Novak v. National Broadcasting Co., 752 F. Supp. 164, 168 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); see Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods. Div. of General Mills Fun Group,
443 F. Supp. 291, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("In most cases courts have no objective
evidence of the process by which the challenged object was developed and thus
are forced to rely on the inferences which may be drawn from two basic facts:
access and substantial similarity."). The rationale for allowing an inference of
copying to substitute for direct proof is the theory that "access gave the defendant the opportunity to copy the plaintiff's work, and the ... similarities
between the two works indicate that the defendant in fact seized the opportunity." GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 7.2.1, at 8. Some courts state that access and
substantial similarity create a presumption of copying. See, e.g., Benson v.
Coca-Cola Co., 795 F.2d 973, 974 (11th Cir. 1986); Arthur Rutenberg Corp. v.
Parrino, 664 F. Supp. 479, 482 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
31. Striking similarity means that "in human experience it is virtually impossible that the two works were independently created." NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 6, § 13.02[B], at 13-22 n.20.2. Striking similarity has also been characterized as "word for word." Id. § 13.03[D], at 13-75.
32. See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 483 (D.
Neb. 1981) (finding access based on striking similarities). But see Selle v. Gibb,
741 F.2d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding striking similarity, but still requiring
evidence of access to establish a "minimum threshold of proof which demonstrates that the inference of access is reasonable"). Commentators, however,
have criticized the Selle decision for requiring more than a bare possibility of
access when striking similarity is found. See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 6, § 13.02[B], at 13-24. Nimmer makes the following analogy: "If two
books of one thousand pages each were word-for-word the same, surely a bare
possibility of access, at most, should be sufficient to counter a claim of coincidental similarity." Id.
33. See Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940, 948 (S.D.
Cal. 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962) ("[A]ccess is but a means of eliminating coincidence or independent effort as an explanation for likenesses between the copyrighted article and the infringing article."); see also LATMAN,
supra note 6, at 195. ("[Striking] similarity provides indirect proof of access,
which in turn combines to provide indirect proof of copying.").
34. See Dirkschneider,543 F. Supp. at 482 n.10 (noting that showing striking similarity places a heavy burden on plaintiffs).
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substantial similarity, the burden then shifts to the defendant
to rebut the inference of copying by producing evidence that his
35
work was independently created.
B. ACCESS
The Copyright Act does not define access; courts have
therefore done so. 36 The prevailing definition of access is an
opportunity to copy the protected material.31 Some courts and
commentators characterize access as the opportunity to view or
hear the plaintiff's work.38 Access, however, is not limited to
situations in which the copier personally came into contact with
the plaintiff's work. Access can exist via a channel of communication, "whereby given individuals may have communicated
to the defendant the contents of plaintiff's work." 39
The plaintiff must submit sufficient evidence to create a
reasonable possibility of access, not just a bare possibility based
35. See Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498, 501 (2d Cir.
1982) ("Evidence of independent creation may be introduced by a defendant to
rebut a plaintiff's prima facie case of infringement."); Novak v. National
Broadcasting Co., 752 F. Supp. 164, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("If a plaintiff raises an
inference of copying, ... a defendant may, nonetheless, rebut this inference
either directly or by demonstrating that it independently created the accused
work either without reference to the plaintiff's work, or by copying a work already in the public domain."). The defendant can introduce evidence of independant creation including her training in the field, the length of time it
took her to create her work, or evidence that her work was copied from a common source. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 7.2.2, at 20.
36. The 1976 Copyright Act does not define access or even infringement.
Rather, the Act states that infringement occurs when one of the copyright
owner's § 106 rights have been violated. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). Section 106
assigns to the copyright owner the right to reproduce the copyrighted work; to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; to distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the public by sale, rental, lease or lending, the
right to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and the right to display the
copyrighted work publicly. Id
37. See NInMvER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.02[A], at 13-16. This "theory of access" is important because direct evidence of copying is often unavailable. HAZARD, supra note 11, 7.2[1], at 7-6.
38. See, e.g., Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 329 F. Supp. 601, 604
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding that access is the "reasonable opportunity to view or
read plaintiff's work"); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 7.2.1.1, at 10 (defining access as reading, seeing or hearing plaintiff's work); HAZARD, supra note 11, 1
7.2[3] ("[Tihe defendant must have had an opportunity to see or hear the copyrighted work.").
39. NINMER & NIMMsER, supra note 6, § 13.02[B], at 13-20; see, e.g., Smith v.
Little, Brown & Co., 245 F. Supp. 451, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (finding access because an editor had an opportunity to view the manuscript, and the alleged infringer had access to the editor), affd, 360 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1966).
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on mere speculation or conjecture. 40 The difference between a
reasonable and a bare possibility is often a very close question 4 '
because there may be considerable geographic distances and
lapses of time separating the access to the plaintiffs work from
the alleged infringement. 42 Another factor that makes this distinction problematic is the difficulty of proof a plaintiff faces if
of several persons
the work has passed through the hands
43
before reaching the alleged infringer.
Courts often infer that a reasonable opportunity to view a
plaintiff's work arose when a third party intermediary with
knowledge of the plaintiff's work had dealings with the alleged
copier. 44 Although the intermediary and alleged copier do not
40. See Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir.
1978) (finding evidence of access speculative and conjectural since court would
have had to assume that both the defendant and the professional licensing association that allegedly transferred work to defendant were lying); Evans v.
Wallace Berrie & Co., 681 F. Supp. 813, 817-18 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (finding "conclusory allegations of access" supported only by a "self serving affidavit" insufficient to survive summary judgment). Plaintiff will not survive summary
judgment if her allegations are unsupported by "specific facts showing there is
a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
41. NnImER & NnIER,supra note 6, § 13.02[A], at 13-19; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 7.2.1.1, at 10 (stating that "virtually all decisions on
which access is an issue turn on inferential proofs").
42. See NIMMER & NuMMER, supra note 6, § 13.02[A], at 13-18 to 13-19; Of.
Nordstrom v. Radio Corp. of Am., 251 F. Supp. 41, 42 (D. Colo. 1965) (finding
opportunity for access despite evidence that defendant was out of the country
all but three of the days that plaintiff's composition was in his files). Compare
Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1067 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding reasonable opportunity for access despite the fact that defendant's alleged contacts with the
third party were 20 years after the release of plaintiffs song and on a different
continent) with Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774, 776 (C.D. Cal. 1981), affd,
698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding only a bare possibility for access even
though 200-700 copies of the allegedly infringed book were available in bookstores near the defendant).
43. See, e.g., Sanford v. CBS, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 711, 713 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
(finding opportunity for access when plaintiff sent tape to CBS Illinois office,
which allegedly sent tape to Los Angeles office, which allegedly made tape
available to CBS artists).
44. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.02[A], at 13-17 ("[E]vidence
that a third party with whom both the plaintiff and defendant were dealing
had possession of plaintiff's work is sufficient to establish access by the defendant."). This theory prevents plaintiffs from being precluded from bringing suit when they did not personally give their work to the alleged infringer.
See, e.g., Kamar Int'l v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 1981)
(finding access because defendant did business with same manufacturer as
plaintiff). But see Evans v. Wallace Berrie & Co., 681 F. Supp. 813, 816 (S.D.
Fla. 1988) (finding no access because court held the intermediary's testimony
that admitted giving plaintiff's work to a publisher who could have communicated it to defendant to be hearsay).
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share a common employer like in the corporate receipt situation,45 the intermediary could start a channel of communication
through which information about the plaintiff's work could be
transmitted to the alleged copier. Some courts, however, find
evidence that can only indirectly link a plaintiff's work to the
alleged copier via a channel of communication too tenuous to
create anything more than a bare possibility of access. 46 In
Meta-Film Associates v. MCA, Inc., the District Court for the
Central District of California addressed this concern by requiring the plaintiff to produce evidence showing that the dealings
between the intermediary and the plaintiff, and those between
the intermediary and the defendant, were on the same subject.4 7 Lack of evidence demonstrating a common connection
48
led the court to find no access.
C.

CORPORATE RECEIPT AS A MEANS OF PROVING ACCESS

When both the intermediary and the alleged infringer are
employees of the same business, a plaintiff often faces an even
more difficult challenge in showing access. The plaintiff, as an
outsider unfamiliar with the defendant business entity, must
produce evidence to contest the involved parties' denials of access.49 While discovery may uncover cursory evidence of certain employee relationships, a plaintiff may still be unable to
produce evidence demonstrating that information or documents
45. See infra part I.C. (discussing corporate receipt).
46. If a channel of communication as between the person to whom
the work is submitted and the person who ultimately created defendant's work is established, but such channel involves a number of different persons, each of whom (other than the original person to
whom plaintiff submitted the work) denies knowledge of the work, is
access a reasonable or only a bare possibility?
NIMMER & NIamER, supra note 6, § 13.02[A], at 13-19. One court found the
channel of access alleged by plaintiff to be a "tortuous chain of hypothetical
transmittals." Meta-Film Assocs. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346, 1355 (C.D.
Cal. 1984).
47. Meta-Film, 586 F. Supp. at 1358. The court stated that the dealings
must involve "some overlap in subject matter to permit an inference of access," but did not state the extent of overlap required. Id.
48. Id. at 1358-59.
49. Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 329 F. Supp. 601, 610 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (noting that the structure of the corporation would be foreign to the
plaintiff and the witnesses would not be the plaintiff's own); see also NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.02[A], at 13-18 n.11 (criticizing Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1945), for finding no possibility
of access when the employee in possession of the plaintiff's work denied passing the work on to the allegedly infringing employee and the plaintiff could
produce no evidence to the contrary).
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in fact "flowed from one area of a firm to another." 50 A plaintiff may also find it impossible to produce any evidence showing
that there was an opportunity to view his work since he rarely
witnesses and third parties rarely notice an alleged copier's contact with the work in question. 5 ' In response, some courts have
adopted the doctrine of "corporate receipt" whereby:
[Tihe fact that one employee of the corporation has possession of
plaintiff's work should warrant a finding that another employee (who
composed defendant's work) had access to plaintiff's work, where by
reason of the physical propinquity between the employees the latter
has the52 opportunity to view the work in the possession of the
former.

This doctrine is related to the analysis that allows a plaintiff to
establish access through a third party intermediary who,
although not a co-worker of the defendant, had dealings with
the defendant and knowledge of the plaintiff's work. The corporate receipt doctrine places this analysis in a business setting,
by presupposing that co-workers in proximity to one another
have dealings with each other, thereby creating the opportunity
to transmit information between them. Because each setting
differs, however, some courts have been reluctant to hold that
receipt necesphysical proximity sufficient to satisfy corporate
53
sarily exists between employees of a business.
Courts have interpreted the doctrine in two manners. The
bare corporate receipt doctrine allows evidence that one employee of the defendant company received the plaintiff's submission to suffice for establishing access for summary judgment
50. Merritt Forbes & Co. v. Newman Inv. Sec., 604 F. Supp. 943, 957
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that summary judgment was premature given the difficulty outsiders face in obtaining evidence in corporate receipt situations).
51. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 7.2.1.1, at 10. Goldstein noted that "the
occasions for direct proof of access will be few since the facts surrounding the
defendant's exposure to the plaintiff's work are unlikely to excite the attention of third parties, and since the defendant himself will have no incentive to
keep his memory of the event alive." Id.
52. NIMMER & NiMMER,supra note 6, § 13.02[A], at 13-17.
53. See Intersong-USA v. CBS, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 274, 281-82 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (finding no access despite submission of tape to CBS employees and radio airplay of the song); Glanzmann v. King, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1594, 1596
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 1988) (finding no access through receipt of plaintiffs
short story by secretary at Columbia), affd, 887 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1989); MetaFilm Assocs. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346, 1357 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (finding no
access when script delivered to director under contract to defendant and with
an office on defendant's lot). But cf.Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 972
F.2d 939, 946 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding sufficient evidence of access to survive
summary judgment where plaintiff claimed to have submitted song to and met
with an employee of MCA Records, but granting summary judgment for defendant based on lack of substantial similarity).
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purposes.m The two courts that adopted this method did not
require the plaintiff to produce any additional evidence, such as
for the allegedly infringing
proof that an employee responsible
55
work received the submission.
Other courts, such as the district court in Meta-Film, already hesitant to infer access from an alleged channel of communication between parties with no common employer, have
imposed an additional restriction on the corporate receipt doctrine. Rejecting "bare corporate receipt" as unresponsive to the
realities of business, 56 these courts require plaintiffs to show
that the employee who received the submission had a close
relationship with the employee who allegedly copied
working
it.57 The court in Meta-Film suggested that this requirement
would be satisfied if these persons were members of the same
work unit or in a supervisory relationship. 58 Courts that accept
this interpretation therefore require plaintiffs to produce evidence of a closer proximity between employees than merely
working for the same company to create an inference of access.
54. See Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 677 (1st Cir.
1967); Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 329 F. Supp. 601, 609 (S.D.N.Y.

1971). In Bevan, the court was considering defendant's motions for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or alternatively for a new trial. Id at 602-03, 610.
The standard for J.N.O.V. and summary judgment, however, are the same.
MOORE, supra note 7, 56.3[14], at 529.
55. Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 677 ("[O]n a motion for summary judgment a
plaintiff should not have to go to the point of showing that every employee of
a corporate defendant received his notification."); Bevan, 329 F. Supp. at 609
("[R]eceipt of a manuscript at defendants' principal corporate office has been
held sufficient to raise a triable issue, despite plaintiff's inability to show receipt by the responsible employee.") (citing Morrissey). Courts and commentators have characterized these two cases as actually having more evidence
than just bare corporate receipt to support their findings of access. See MetaFilm, 586 F. Supp. at 1357 (noting that the key feature of cases which demonstrate access based on corporate receipt is the close relationship between the
intermediary and the alleged copier, not just the fact that they shared a common employer); MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW
§ 9.4, at 267 n.10 (citing Meta-Film).
56. Meta-Film, 586 F. Supp. at 1357-58. The court noted, "In such a business [as filmmaking], countless unsolicited scripts are submitted to numbers of
individuals on studio lots every day. Under these circumstances, it is clearly
unreasonable to attribute the knowledge of any one individual ... to every
other individual just because they occupy offices on the same studio lot." I&i
at 1357.
57. Id; see also Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 972 F.2d 939, 944 (8th
Cir. 1992) (holding that the close relationship, as required by Meta-Film, was
present).
58. Meta-Film, 586 F. Supp at 1357. The court implied that "an individual
in a position to provide suggestions or comments with respect to the defendant's work" would be adequate. Id
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SuMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment was traditionally a disfavored remedy
in copyright infringement actions. 5 9 The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in Arnstein v. Porter held that courts should not
grant summary judgment in copyright infringement actions if
there is "the slightest doubt as to the facts. ' 60 Courts were reluctant to employ summary judgment because access and substantial similarity can be extremely close questions of fact 61 and
often rest on credibility determinations. 62 Commentators have
since discredited the Arnstein "slightest doubt" standard; 63 one
described it as a "misleading gloss" on the language of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).6 Courts no longer consider Arn65
stein's summary judgment standard to be good law.
59. Hartnick, supra note 22, at 57; see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d
464, 474 (2d Cir. 1946) (stating that "generally there should be trials in plagiarism suits").
60. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
61. IMLat 469; see also Latman, supra note 27, at 1211 (noting that credibility questions arising from the issue of copying "could well block summary
judgment in a case in any way close").
62. See Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 329 F. Supp. 601, 609
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (stating that "access is predominantly a question of credibility"); see also Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 360 F.2d 928, 929 (2d Cir. 1966)
(stating that "credibility of this testimony [as to access] was an issue to be determined by the trial judge"). The court in Arnstein stated its rationale for
mandating that issues of access go to the jury as follows:
If, after hearing both parties testify, the jury disbelieves defendant's
denials, it can, from such facts, reasonably infer access. It follows
that, as credibility is unavoidably involved, a genuine issue of material
fact presents itself. With credibility a vital factor, plaintiff is entitled
to a trial where the jury can observe the witnesses while testifying.
Plaintiff must not be deprived of the invaluable privilege of cross-examining the defendant-the "crucial test of credibility"--in the presence of the jury.
154 F.2d at 469-70 (footnotes omitted).
63. One commentator has stated that:
Arnstein ... was too restrictive and was tinged with conservatism and
great caution.... [The court] posed the issue as "whether the lower
court under Rule 56, properly deprived plaintiff of a trial of his copyright infringement action." The issue could have been posed as a
method of striking sham claims and defenses to avoid dilatory tactics,
and to relieve court calendars which could have produced a different
result.
Hartnick, supra note 22, at 55-56; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 7.4.2 at
39-40 (stating that Arnstein '"has since been limited, ignored or abandoned in
the Second Circuit"). But see Hartnick, supra note 22, at 70 ("Arnstein ...
sadly remains influential for summary judgment in copyright law."). Despite
its obsolescence in summary judgment jurisprudence, Arnstein continues to be
important in explaining copyright infringement. See supra note 22.
64. Hartnick, supra note 22, at 56.
65. See Beal v. Lindsey, 468 F.2d 287, 291 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating that "[t]he
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Courts currently prohibit summary judgment when there
is a genuine issue of material fact. 66 The rule "mandates the
entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial. '6 7 The increasingly prodigious costs of discovery and litigation 68 underscore the need to
use summary judgment to reduce the number of unmeritorious
copyright infringement lawsuits. 69 Access, however, is a question of fact.70 Disposition by summary judgment is inappropriate,71 therefore, if conflicting evidence creates a genuine factual
rule of Arnstein v. Porter... is no longer good law"); Smith v. Weinstein, 578
F. Supp. 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating Arnstein does not represent "the present state of the law"), affd mem, 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984); Roberts v. Dahl,
168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 428, 435 (IM. Cir. Ct. Jan. 21, 1971) (stating Arnstein is
"virtually destroyed... as a meaningful precedent"), qffd, 286 N.E.2d 51 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1972).
66.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Courts

have applied this standard in copyright cases. See Moore v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., 972 F.2d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 1992) (upholding summary judgment because
of plaintiff's failure to demonstrate substantial similarity); Baxter v. MCA,
Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir.) (holding material issue existed as to substantial similarity), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 5, § 7.4.2, at 39 (stating that "'no genuine issue as to any material fact'
[standard] governs comtemporary copyright infringement decisions").
67. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The plaintiff ultimately bears the burden of proving copying by the defendant. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 12.11[D], at 12-161 (stating "the plaintiff has the burden of
proving both access and substantial similarity").
68. See Hartnick, supra note 22, at 66 ("To settle a meritless case, because
summary judgment is unavailable, is wrong and permits a misuse of the legal
system."). One commentator has also stated:
[O]ne need only consider the businesses of motion pictures, television
and publishing-industries which are frequent targets for claims
(many often in the frivolous category) but which nonetheless require
careful handling and the expenditure of substantial time, effort and
money because even courts disposed to consider summary judgment
still permit plaintiffs to engage in extensive discovery.
Rosen & Fairhurst, supra note 26, at *2. But see Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d
464, 471 (2d Cir. 1946) (noting that "trial by affidavits" would often favor the
party with the best lawyers).
69. See Rosen & Fairhurst, supra note 26 at *2 (stating that "[i]n those industries (motion pictures, television and publishing) which are overburdened
by the sheer number and costliness of unmeritorious lawsuits, such claims
warrant disposition by summary judgment procedure").
70. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 469; see also HARRY G. HENN, HENN ON COPYRIGHT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 127.6, at 351 n.27 (3d ed. 1991) ("Find-

ings of access and substantial similarity are factual, i.e., reviewable for clear
error.").
71. The court in Celotex asserted that summary judgment is not "a disfavored procedural shortcut," but rather is designed to "secure the just, speedy
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dispute or if the court must weigh credibility to decide the
issue.72
II. CURRENT APPLICATIONS OF THE CORPORATE
RECEIPT DOCTRINE
The fact-specific nature of copyright infringement cases
has led courts to ad hoc decisions on the issue of access. 73 In
reaching their decisions, courts have also sought ways to discourage plaintiffs from instigating meritless copyright litigation. These considerations suggest a need for a clear standard
on access that is sufficiently stringent to eliminate unnecessary
litigation, yet which equitably allocates the burdens of production between the parties.
The corporate receipt doctrine accepts circumstantial evidence of receipt of the plaintiff's work at the defendant company and the physical proximity that often exists among coworkers in place of more direct but often unobtainable eviand inexpensive determination of every action." 477 U.S. at 327 (citing FED. R.
CIV. P. 1). The primary function of summary judgment is "intercepting factu-

ally deficient claims and defenses in advance of trial." Hartnick, supra note
22, at 56.
72. MOORE ET AL., supra note 7, 56.3[15]; see also Baxter v. MCA, Inc.,
812 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir.) (stating that "Rule 56 calls for the judge to determine whether there exists a genuine issue for trial, not to weigh the evidence
himself and determine the truth of the matter"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954
(1987). Even Arnstein's detractors agree that summary judgment is inappropriate in some circumstances. One commentator has stated that "the Rule
should not apply to any issue which cannot be resolved without observation of
the demeanor of witnesses in order to evaluate their credibility." Hartnick,
supra note 22, at 55. He further states that "[s]ummary judgment cannot be
had if there is an extremely close question of fact in a copyright or any other
case." Id. at 71.
73. The individualized nature of copyright cases is one of the most difficult aspects in analyzing these decisions. See Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 329 F. Supp. 601, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("[Copyright infringement claims]
raise the.., problem of irreconcilable, ad hoc decisions, which are almost inevitable, given the vague contours of copyright protection."). The Bevan court
further comments:
This action ... presents us with a picture all too familiar in copyright
litigation; a legal problem vexing in its difficulty, a dearth of squarely
applicable precedents, a business setting so common that the dearth of
precedents seems inexplicable, and an almost complete absence of guidance from the terms of the Copyright Act.
Id. (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 305 (2d
Cir. 1963); see also HENN, supra note 70, 27.8, at 353 ("Infringement decisions
are ad hoc and often determination is a matter of degree.") The access inquiry
is particularly fact-specific. See Meta-Film Assocs. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp.
1346, 1355 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (stating that "each case involving the question of
access presents its own set of unique facts").

1993]

CORPORATE RECEIPT

1425

dence of access. The majority of courts that define the doctrine
to require a significant nexus or close relationship between the
employee who received the work and the alleged infringer,
however, are skeptical that receipt of the plaintiff's work by
one employee necessarily creates an opportunity to communicate about the work to other employees. These courts, therefore, have interpreted the doctrine restrictively in an effort to
address modern business practices in which companies may
have employees at many different floors, buildings, or office locations. In so doing, they have intentionally diminished the
plaintiff's ability to survive summary judgment on the issue of
access.
A.

"BARE CORPORATE RECEIPT" CASES

In the 1967 decision Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble,74 the
First Circuit found that receipt of the plaintiff's sweepstakes
rules at the defendant's principal corporate office was enough
to raise a genuine issue of fact as to access. 75 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, based on
affidavits by pertinent company employees denying that they
saw the rules. 76 The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the corporate receipt doctrine created a sufficient inference of
access for the case to proceed to trial.77 The court stated:
Even if we assume that if, at the trial of the case, it should be found
that the particular employees of the defendant responsible for the
contest were in fact without knowledge of plaintiff's rules ....
on a
motion for summary judgment a plaintiff should not have to go to the
point of showing that every employee of a corporate defendant received his notification.7 8

The Arnstein standard for summary judgment used in Morrissey-that it is inappropriate if there is the "slightest doubt as to
the facts"-is no longer good law.79 Courts in the First Circuit
74. 379 F.2d. 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
75. Id at 677.
76. Id77. Id The court stated: "lit [cannot] be said that no issue of fact as to
access 'lurks' merely because it seems to the court that plaintiff's own proof
has been satisfactorily contradicted." Id The court actually made a two-step
inference in this case, since there was no proof that plaintiff's submission was
ever received. Id After first asserting that evidence of the plaintiff mailing
the work created an inference that the letter was received, the court then held
that evidence of receipt created an inference of access. Id

78. Id.
79. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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have neither followed nor overruled Morrissey's holding as to
corporate receipt.
Four years later, in Bevan v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem, 80 the District Court for the Southern District of New York
adopted the "bare corporate receipt" standard established in
Morrissey.81 The court acknowledged the "generous definition
of access"8 2 that suffices in the Second Circuit and held 3 that
receipt of a manuscript of plaintiff's play at defendant's principal corporate office satisfied the requirement of access.8 4 The
court's rationale for adopting "bare corporate receipt" focused
80. 329 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). A precursor to Morrissey, cited in
Bevan, was Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 245 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
affd 360 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1966). In Smith, the plaintiff sent a manuscript to
the manager of defendant's New York office, who forwarded it to the managing editor of defendant's Boston office, who subsequently read and rejected it.
Id at 453. When the defendant later contracted with another author to write
a book on the same subject as plaintiff's manuscript, plaintiff claimed that the
editor working with the hired author had learned about plaintiff's manuscript
from her colleague, the managing editor who had originally read it. Id at 45354. The court held that it was reasonable to infer that one editor could have
the opportunity to learn about plaintiff's work from the other. Id at 458.
81. Bevan, 329 F. Supp. at 609-10. Despite criticisms that the court actually had more evidence than just bare corporate receipt to find access, the
court left no question as to its intention to follow Morrissey. It stated, "The
issue of the sufficiency of bare corporate receipt has never been... isolated
for decision in this Circuit or in the New York courts.... I believe that Morrissey is or would be adopted by this Circuit." Id
82. Id at 609. This "generous definition" required "plaintiff [to] show no
more than that defendant had a reasonable opportunity to view or read plaintiff's work." Id at 604. Although sometimes phrased less generously, this definition, or some variation thereof, is currently used by all courts. See supra
part I.B. (discussing access).
83. Although this decision was considering a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, both a J.N.O.V. and summary judgment determine whether a jury could reasonably decide in favor of an issue "as a matter
of law." See supra note 54.
84. Bevan, 329 F. Supp. at 609. The judge stated that he would not have
been inclined to accept plaintiff's theory of access, but he could "[n]ot say that
the jury was not entitled as a matter of law to do so." Id The manuscript was
mailed to the president of the company who was involved in preproduction
conferences for the allegedly copied television series, Hogan's Heroes. Id at
603-04. Other courts charge that implicit in the court's finding was additional
evidence of access beyond just corporate receipt since the play that plaintiff's
manuscript was based upon, Stalag 17, had achieved popularity and notoriety,
and evidence showed that it actually reached an executive with responsibility.
See Meta-Film Assocs. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346, 1357 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
("[The relationship between the parties in Bevan] went far beyond the simple
fact that they shared a common employer."); Glanzmann v. King, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d
1594, 1596 (E.D. Mich., Aug. 29, 1988) (citing Meta-Film), aflTd, 887 F.2d 265
(6th Cir. 1989). However, the court in Bevan unequivocably stated that it was
adopting the bare corporate receipt doctrine. 329 F. Supp. at 610.
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on the nature of the access inquiry as a credibility determination, which leaves to the factfinder, in this case the jury, the
task of deciding whom to believe.8 5 The court noted that "[a]
contrary course would saddle a plaintiff with disproving non-access within a corporate structure foreign to him and by wit7
nesses not his own."'8 6 The Bevan decision remains good law.
B.

META-FLM MODIFIES CORPORATE RECEIPT

Other courts that have had an opportunity to rule on the
issue currently disfavor the more lenient corporate receipt
standard of Bevan and Morrissey. These courts require the
plaintiff to show additional evidence of a relationship between
the employee who received the work and the one who allegedly
infringed it. 88 Meta-Film Assocs. v. MCA, Inc.8 9 established the
proposition that access will usually be found where "an individual in a position to provide suggestions or comments with respect to the defendant's work-a supervisory employee or an
employee within the unit from which the defendant's work was
developed-had the opportunity to view the plaintiff's work."90
In other words, there must be a close and substantial nexus between the person who possessed knowledge of the plaintiff's
85. "[A]ccess is predominantly a question of credibility... to be weighed
by the fact-finder against defense denials of knowledge, often accompanied by
some explanation of the corporate handling of the submission." Bevan, 329 F.
Supp. at 609.
86. I& at 610.
87. See, e.g., Merritt Forbes & Co. v. Newman Inv. Sec., 604 F. Supp. 943,

957 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing Bevan in holding that summary judgment was premature due to the difficulty of proof inherent in corporate receipt).
88. See Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 972 F.2d 939, 944-45 (8th Cir.
1992); Glanzmann, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1596; Meta-Film, 586 F. Supp. at 1357. In
Glanzmann v. King, author Stephen King was accused of copying his book
Christine from the plaintiff, who had previously sent a similar short story en-

titled The Side Swiper to Columbia Pictures, the company that made a movie
out of King's book. Glanzmann, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1595. The court rejected
plaintiff's claim that King could have gained access to the short story from the
secretary working at Columbia who responded to plaintiff's submission. I& In

so doing, the court adopted the approach of Meta-Film as a "much more realistic view" than that espoused by Bevan. Id- "[Tihe key feature present [in
cases allowing access to be shown circumstantially] was the close relationship
linking the intermediary and the alleged copier, which in each case went far
beyond the simple fact that they shared a common employer." Id- at 1596
(quoting Meta-Film, 586 F. Supp. at 1357).
89. 586 F. Supp. 1346 (C.D. Cal. 1984).

90. Id. at 1357. The intermediary in past corporate receipt cases was, according to Meta-Film, "a supervisor with responsibility for the defendant's project, was part of the work unit as the copier, or contributed creative ideas or
material to the defendant's work." I& at 1355-56.
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work and the person who allegedly copied it to create an inference of access. 91
In Meta-Film, the court ruled that the plaintiff did not
meet the requirements of corporate receipt by submitting evidence that he sent his script to a director under contract to and
on the same film lot as the defendant company, which later
made a successful film on the same subject. 92 Because the director did not oversee the creation of the defendant's films, nor
work in the unit that developed the allegedly infringing film,
the court found the link between the director and the alleged
infringer too attenuated to infer access. 93 The court distinguished Bevan and Morrissey as cases in which "the alleged infringer and intermediary occupy positions such that it is
natural that information possessed by one would be imparted to
the other," thereby characterizing the bare corporate receipt
cases as falling within the confines of its new standard. 94 The
court also explicitly rejected, however, a result the bare corporate receipt cases may have suggested:95 that the opportunity
to copy plaintiff's work may exist merely by virtue of the intermediary and alleged infringer sharing a common employer.9 6
More recently, in Moore v. Columbia Pictures,9 7 the plaintiff was a songwriter who submitted a tape to an employee of
91. Id at 1357. The court rejected plaintiff's claim of access because there
was "little, if any, nexus between the individual who possessed knowledge of
plaintiffs work and the creator of the allegedly infringing work." Id
92. Id
93. Id "[P]laintiff must show something more than that he sent his work
to a director who was under contract to the defendant and had an office on the
defendant's lot." Id
94. Id. at 1356. Commentators have also accepted this explanation. See
LEAFFER, supra note 55, § 9.4, at 267 n.10 ("The key aspect of these cases is a
close relationship linking the intermediary and the alleged copier, not just a
showing that they shared the same employer.").
95. To prevent misunderstanding, the court added in a footnote that even
if bare corporate receipt were found to be sufficient to establish access in that
circuit, since the script was submitted to the director in his individual capacity
and not as an employee of Universal, the access requirement still would not be
satisfied. Meta-Film, 586 F. Supp. at 1358 n.6. This leaves open the obvious
question of why, if the intermediary was not an employee of the defendant
corporation, the court was discussing corporate receipt caselaw. Although this
Note does not advocate that corporate receipt is necessarily inappropriate, it
was disingenuous of the Meta-Film court to create a corporate receipt rule for
a fact situation to which the rule may not apply.
96. Id at 1357-58. "To the extent that any case suggests... that 'bare corporate receipt' is sufficient as a matter of law to preclude a finding of non-access ... the court rejects such reasoning." Id
97. 972 F.2d 939 (8th Cir. 1992).
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MCA records. 98 The plaintiff claimed that through this employee, his tape got into the hands of a songwriting team that
used plaintiff's work to compose their own.9 9 Although the
court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant for lack of
substantial similarity,100 it reversed the trial court and found
that this connection created a reasonable possibility of access,
"at least for summary judgment purposes." 10 1 The court also,
however, adopted the Meta-Film standard: "Like other courts,
we believe that the corporate receipt doctrine applies where
there is a 'relationship linking the intermediary and the alleged
copier .... 1 "1102

C. EFFECT OF CORPORATE RECEIPT ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
If a plaintiff cannot provide direct evidence of copying, he
must produce sufficient circumstantial evidence of access and
substantial similarity to create a genuine issue of material fact
to proceed to trial. Even though the plaintiff always retains the
burden of proving copying, 0 3 at summary judgment the moving
party has the burden of showing the absence of any triable
issue.' 04
Parties may not rest on mere allegations or denials of access for summary judgment purposes. 10 5 Thus, if a plaintiff bases allegations of access on mere speculation or conjecture, 0 6 or
if a plaintiff only offers hypothetical scenarios, unsupported by
98.
99.

I at 941.
MCA released the allegedly infringing song as the theme to the movie

Ghostbusters II. Id.
100.

Id. at 947.

101. Id at 945.
102. Id- at 942 (citing Meta-Film Assocs. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346,
1357 (C.D. Cal. 1984)). The court found that the "key feature" of a close relationship was indeed present in this situation. Id at 944-45.
103. See NIMMIER & NIamIaR, supra note 6, § 12.11[D], at 12-161 (stating that
the plaintiff must prove both access and substantial similarity to prove copying

circumstantially).
104. MOORE ET AL., supra note 7, 56.3[14], at 530. For the purposes of ruling on a summary judgment motion, all factual inferences are to be taken
against the moving party. Id- 56.3[15], at 531.
105. FED. R. Cirv. P. 56(e); see also Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co.,
584 F.2d 111, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that "the nonmoving party must
rebut with 'significant probative' evidence"); Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker
Bros., 529 F. Supp. 1204, 1214 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (" 'If the most that can be hoped
for is the discrediting of defendant's denials at trial no question of material

fact is presented.' ") (quoting Modern Home Inst. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 513 F.2d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 1975)), affd mem, 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.
1982).
106.

See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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any evidence, 10 7 to explain a defendant's connection to her
work, no genuine issue of material fact exists. By definition,
corporate receipt means that plaintiff has produced at least a
minimal amount of evidence, because the defendant corporation possessed the plaintiff's work for some period of time. The
disagreement lies in whether this evidence alone merits a trial
1 08
on the issue of access.
A court also may grant a defendant's summary judgment
motion on the issue of access if the defendant company produces evidence showing that it followed a company policy established to prevent any channel of communication between
the employees who receive the submissions and those who are
in positions to use them. If the defendant produces evidence
that such a policy was in place and that it followed the policy,
courts almost invariably grant summary judgment for the de10 9
fendant on the issue of access.
In Vantage Point v. ParkerBrothers,110 the court found a
lack of access even though the company acknowledged receiving the plaintiff's proposal for a game. The defendant had a
long-established policy under which employees routed all unprofessional, unsolicited submissions directly from the mail
room to the customer service department and returned them
unexamined to their senders, thereby ensuring that the employees involved in game development did not see them.1 1 1
The plaintiff claimed that Milton Bradley used this policy to
107. See Scott v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 449 F. Supp. 518, 520 (D.D.C.
1978) (holding that a mere assertion of access, unsupported by significant, affirmative and probative evidence, is inadequate).
108. The purpose of summary judgment is to "'pierce the pleadings and to
assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial."'
Vantage Point, 529 F. Supp. at 1207 (quoting Adv. Comm. Note to Proposed
Amendments to Rule 56(e), 31 F.R.D. 648 (1962)).
109. Courts grant summary judgment on the issue of access for the defendants despite flaws in the business procedures that create a possibility of access.
In both Vantage Point, 529 F. Supp. at 1204, and Novak v. National Broadcasting Co., 752 F. Supp. 164, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), the submissions were not entirely insulated from the decision-making employees and actually reached the
secretaries of the company presidents. The courts nonetheless granted summary judgment for the defendants. See also Downey v. General Foods Corp.,
286 N.E.2d 257, 260 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that summary judgment was
proper because company kept the plaintiff's submission under "lock and key"
in files in which the allegedly infringing department had no need to research).
110. 529 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982).
111. Id. at 1211. The customer service department sent "professional" unsolicited submissions to the development department whereas "non-professional" submissions were returned unexamined. Id. The court concluded that
if plaintiff had produced evidence that the company treated his submission as
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hide the company's true objective of obtaining game proposals
while avoiding any obligation to the persons who created the
ideas, but he had no evidence to back up this allegation. 112
Even though the company deviated slightly from its policy-the
submission reached the secretary of the company president who
then returned it unopened-the court found no evidence of
policy of insulating
deviation from the company's overarching
113
the creative personnel from submissions.
In Novak v. National Broadcasting Co., z4 the defendant
had a different procedure for unsolicited submissions. NBC's
policy was to route manuscripts to the legal department for return, but to send tapes such as the plaintiff's to the addressees'
secretaries for processing and return. 1 5 The plaintiff's tape of
comedy sketches was addressed to the president of NBC, Brandon Tartikoff.116 According to Tartikoff's deposition testimony,
it was his policy never to review unsolicited material. 1 7 Tartikoff's secretary testified, however, that they usually forwarded the submissions to him, and he sent personal notes
back to those submitters whose work he decided to view. 118 In
fact, the note the plaintiffs received with the return of their
tape constituted a significant piece of evidence because it was of
the type that a secretary, not Tartikoff, would usually send.1 9
"professional," such treatment together with similarity would permit an inference of copying. Id

112. Id.
113. Id at 1212. The court stated:
Undoubtedly defendant's showing on this point could be stronger.
For example, [the president] might have stated more explicitly that
his secretary determined for him whether materials sent by mail were
a professional submission or not, and whether correspondence separa-

ble from the submission itself was ever put before him, or the secretary might have provided a corroborating affidavit. But we think that
the affidavit he submitted... sufficiently explained what happened to
the submission to remove any issue that he ever examined it, and
therefore obligated plaintiff to produce facts controverting this ver-

sion in order to preclude summary judgment ....
Id
114. 752 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
115. Id- at 169. "Processing" by the secretaries entailed "forward[ing] such
submissions either to [Tartikoff's] Burbank or his New York city [sic] office,
depending upon his whereabouts at the time of receipt. When the submissions
pile up, Tartikoff's secretaries check with him to make sure he does not want
to look at any of them, and then send back the submissions to the senders,
often with a typed note acknowledging the return." Id116. I& at 167.
117. Id at 169.
118. Id.
119. Id
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Despite the apparent deviation from the policy, the court held
that it was not significant enough to raise a genuine issue of
fact as to access. 20
III.

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING CORPORATE
RECEIPT CASES

Courts that follow Meta-Film's approach to corporate receipt are skeptical that access by one employee of a business entity necessarily creates access by other employees. 121 The
additional requirement of a substantial nexus or relationship
between the intermediary and the alleged infringer creates a
more restrictive standard of corporate receipt. Courts have denominated a subclass of the corporate receipt doctrine, called
"bare corporate receipt" to distinguish the more lenient standard from the current one. 122 These courts also discredit bare
corporate receipt as unresponsive to the realities of modern
business. 123 They imply that "bare corporate receipt" creates
only a "bare possibility of access."' 4 In certain circumstances,
however, "bare corporate receipt" may create a reasonable opportunity for the alleged copier to come into contact with the
plaintiff's work. The reasonableness of the opportunity depends on the facts of the case, and on the size and structure of
the business.
The plaintiff only has to show that the alleged copier had
an opportunity to copy her work for access purposes-not that
120. IH The court noted that plaintiff failed to produce any affirmative evidence showing that NBC did not follow its policy. Id The court did not, however, question the validity of the policy itself, which clearly did not insulate
Tartikoff from submissions because they were forwarded to his offices. Id
Nor did the court seem concerned about the apparent inconsistencies in the
deposition testimony of Tartikoff and his secretary. IH These factors appear
to create a question regarding adherence to the policy, and the soundness of
the policy itself, that presents a "genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (quoting FED.R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
121. See Meta-Film Assocs. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346, 1357 (C.D. Cal.
1984) (finding that the "simple fact of sharing a common employer" should be
considered insufficient to establish access).
122. See id at 1355 (stating that plaintiff must show that the defendant had
more than a "bare possibility" of access).
123. See id. at 1358 (rejecting bare corporate receipt as "unreasonable" in
light of the "realities of the business"); see also Moore v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., 972 F.2d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that the corporate receipt doctrine articulated by Meta-Film is a much more realistic view than the bare corporate receipt doctrine of Bevan).
124. See supra note 40.
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it was actually copied.1 -5 Therefore, if the alleged infringer denies that he copied plaintiffs work, this denial actually goes to
the ultimate question of copying, and not to the threshold access inquiry. 12 6 If the alleged infringer denies that he even had
the opportunity to copy plaintiff's work, but the plaintiff alleges that there was an opportunity supported by evidence of
corporate receipt, a credibility issue may result, depending on
the facts of the case, which is appropriately resolved at a trial
on the merits.

A. A PROPOSAL TO CLARIFY CORPORATE RECEIPT
Between the cases in which the plaintiff offers only speculative allegations of access without any supporting evidence,
and the rare cases in which the plaintiff possesses direct evidence of access, lies a "factual middle ground"'12 7 for which it is
difficult to create a bright-line rule that applies to all corporate
receipt situations. The primary factors to which the corporate
receipt doctrine directs an analysis are the degree of difficulty
plaintiffs face to obtain evidence of access and the existence of
any company policies designed to prevent access by relevant
employees. The size of the business and the complexity of its
organizational structure influence both of these factors.
1.

Analogy to Overlapping Subject Matter Requirement in
Third Party Intermediary Cases

When the intermediary and the alleged infringer are not
part of the same business enterprise, the court in Meta-Film
held that the dealings between the parties "must involve some
overlap in subject matter to permit an inference of access.21S
As support for its rule, Meta-Film distinguishes three cases in
which the dealings between the plaintiff and the intermediary
125. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

126. "The trier of fact may conclude that the person who created defendant's work had but did not avail himself of the opportunity to view, but this
conclusion properly goes to the ultimate issue of copying, and not to the
subordinate issue of access." NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.02[A], at
13-16 to 13-17; see also LATMAN, supra note 6, at 192 ("Proof of access should
not be confused with proof of copying.").
127. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 7.2.1, at 12. Goldstein states that cases
falling within "this factual middle ground usually rest on a strong intuition, or
high statistical likelihood, that the defendant had at some point encountered

plaintiff's work." Id
128.
1984).

Meta-Film Assocs. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346, 1358 (C.D. Cal.
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and between the intermediary and the defendant involved overlapping subject matter, therefore justifying findings of access.
The court in Meta-Film characterizes the dealings in
KamarInternationalv. Russ Berrie & Co.'2 9 as involving "identical subject matter,"'130 because the intermediary traded in
stuffed toy animals with both the plaintiff and the defendant. 131
The Meta-Film court also cites Russ Berrie & Co. v. Jerry Eisner Co., 132 in which the dealings involved a particular stuffed
toy gorilla, 133 and De Acosta v. Brown,'3 in which the dealings
between the intermediary and the defendant related to rethe life of the
search for the defendant's book, which was based
135
same character as the plaintiff's screenplay.
It is Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 1 36 however,

that the Meta-Film court argues "present[s] the most closely
analogous factual situation" to that of the Meta-Film case.137 In
Ferguson, the plaintiff submitted her work to BMI, a music
publisher. 138 The defendant, a prolific composer, also had dealings with this organization. 39 Because the defendant's dealings
with BMI were "not related to either the plaintiff or her composition," the court found the defendant had no opportunity to
copy. 140 The analogy is misplaced, however; in Ferguson, the
129. 657 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1981).
130. Meta-Film, 586 F. Supp. at 1358.
131. Kamar, 657 F.2d at 1062.
132. 482 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
133. Id at 984.
134. 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944).
135. Id. at 410. In fact, the court found that the similarities between the
two books were "too pointed to justify any other conclusion than that of copying." Id. The court did not characterize them as "striking," however, and still
addressed the issue of access. Id. The plaintiff submitted her book on the life
of Clara Barton to the intermediary, an agent. Id. The defendant later consulted this intermediary regarding "only a small and an early part of Clara
Barton's life and only a portion of defendant Brown's book." Id. The court
found that these limitations affected only the amount of recovery, not whether
recovery itself was possible. Id.
136. 584 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1978).
137. Meta-Film Assocs. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346, 1359 (C.D. Cal.
1984). In Meta-Film, the dealings between the parties were all related to directing movies, but the movies were not on the same subject. The plaintiff's
submission was entitled FratRats. Id. at 1349. The allegedly infringing film
was Animal House. Id. Both satirized college fraternity life. Id. The defendant Universal hired the intermediary who received plaintiff's work as a director for an entirely different film entitled Bingo Long and the Traveling All
Stars. Id. at 1352.
138. 584 F.2d at 112.
139. Id. at 112 n.1.
140. Id.
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intermediary was a large organization while in Meta-Film, it
to the defendant and
was an individual who was under contract
1 41
working on the defendant's film lot.
The term "overlapping subject matter" is necessarily vague
due to the differing fact situations in copyright cases. 14 The
court in Meta-Film created this rule in an attempt to reconcile
the holdings of past third party intermediary cases into a rule
applicable to all third party intermediary situations. 4 3 The
court did not address, however, the difficulty in trying to confine all future third party intermediary situations to a narrow
rule that does not even apply consistently to past cases.
The overlapping subject matter requirement may also place
an insurmountable evidentiary burden on plaintiffs. For example, if the intermediary and the defendant deny that they communicated on a subject matter which overlaps with the
plaintiff's work, the plaintiff can succeed only if he or she has
knowledge of the communications between the other parties.
It is unrealistic to expect plaintiffs to possess information about
conversations to which they were not privy. In addition, dealings on any subject matter create an opportunity to communicate the contents of the plaintiff's work, which is all that
access, by definition, requires.'4 Whether the opportunity was
reasonable depends on the nature of the dealings-information
which, like direct evidence of the copying itself, the plaintiff is
usually unable to obtain. 145 For these reasons, courts should
permit evidence of dealings between the parties on any subject
matter to satisfy the access requirement.
2.

The Nexus Requirement in Corporate Receipt Cases

When the plaintiff alleges that an opportunity to copy his
work arose among co-workers of the same business, the MetaFilm court held that a nexus must exist between the employee
with knowledge of the plaintiff's work and the alleged in141. Meta-Film, 586 F. Supp. at 1357.
142. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
143. Meta-Film, 586 F. Supp. at 1358-59, 1359 n.7.
144. See NImNER & NIMMEB, supra note 6, § 13.02[A], at 13-19 ("In view of
the fact that it would usually not be possible for the plaintiff to offer direct
evidence of such knowledge by the various persons in such a channel of communication, it would seem that proof of the fact of communication (on any
subject) as between the various persons in the channel should suffice to permit the trier of fact to find access, without any need to directly counter such
persons' respective denials of knowledge.").
145. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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fringer. 1' Pre-trial discovery may reveal whether the intermediary "was a supervisor with responsibility for the defendant's
project, [or] was part of the same work unit as the copier," two
of the situations Meta-Film suggests would satisfy corporate receipt. 147 If formal relationships such as these were the only
ones in which an opportunity to communicate information
about a submission might arise, a plaintiff would not face insurmountable difficulty in establishing a channel of communication. As Meta-Film suggests, however, there are informal
situations in which the contents of a plaintiff's work may be
communicated.
If the intermediary "contributed creative ideas or material
to the defendant's work,' 148 Meta-Film states that this relationship could also create a reasonable opportunity to copy the
plaintiff's work. This third example of a relationship "in which
it is natural that information possessed by one [employee]
would be imparted to the other,"'149 while seemingly broadening the applicability of corporate receipt, in fact demonstrates
the difficulty of proof underlying the need for the doctrine.
The ability to produce evidence that the intermediary contributed in some manner to the alleged infringer's work would displace the plaintiff's need for the corporate receipt doctrine,
because he would possess direct evidence that the intermediary
had an opportunity to communicate the contents of his work to
the alleged copier.
The preceeding three examples of employee relationships
that would satisfy Meta-Film's corporate receipt standard are
not the only conceivable situations in which an opportunity to
copy might arise in the workplace. The recipient of plaintiff's
work in Meta-Film was under contract to the defendant, but
not technically an employee.'5 0 Therefore, in that particular
situation, the court may have been justified in concluding that
it was "unreasonable to attribute the knowledge of any one individual-especially a non-employee--to every other individual
just because they occupy offices on the same studio lot."'151
146. Meta-Film, 586 F. Supp. at 1357.
147. Id- at 1355-56.
148. Id. at 1356.
149. Id
150. Id. at 1357.
151. Id The court states that the director "was not an executive overseeing the development of the studio's films. He did not work in a unit with Universal employees who were working on films other than the one which he was
directing. Moreover, he had no interest in transmitting information to other

1993]

CORPORATE RECEIPT

1437

Where the intermediary and the alleged infringer are both employees of the same business entity, however, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the opportunity to share ideas may
exist in many situations, both formal and informal. A rule limited to the situations articulated in Meta-Film may easily be circumvented by defendants who know they will not be held
accountable if the pertinent employees are not in a clearly defined work relationship. In addition, co-workers may have a
greater incentive to deny knowledge of the plaintiff's work
than would a third party intermediary who is not an employee
of the defendant.
For purposes of summary judgment, therefore, if the plaintiff cannot produce evidence of a close relationship between the
employee with knowledge of plaintiff's work and the one who
allegedly copied it, and the size and structure of the defendant
company suggests to the court that the plaintiff's ability to obtain evidence is hindered, bare corporate receipt should be sufficient to shift the burden of production to the defendant to
show that there was no opportunity for access. Otherwise, the
nexus requirement creates exactly the same barrier for plaintiffs that the doctrine was designed to cure: it requires plaintiffs to produce evidence of channels of communication within
business entities that is often impossible to obtain.
A defendant could satisfy its burden of production by introducing evidence that the intermediary and the alleged copier
were not in a position to share information about the subject
matter of plaintiff's submission. Just as when the intermediary
and infringer do not share a common employer, however, evidence of communication on any subject between co-workers
should also be seen to create the opportunity to transmit information about plaintiff's work.
A defendant may also meet its burden by producing evidence of a company policy like the one in Vantage Point. 52
The court's holding in Meta-Film was motivated by both the desire to discourage excessive litigation and the "realities of the
business." 1 53 Established procedures that effectively insulate
creative and decision-making employees of large businesses
Universal employees or executives regarding films that he was not interested
in directing." Id; see supra note 95.
152. Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., 529 F. Supp. 1204, 1211 (E.D.N.Y.
1981), qffd, 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982); see supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (discussing Vantage Point).
153. Meta-Film, 586 F. Supp. at 1357; see also supranote 56 and accompanying text.
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from outside submissions are convincing when combined with
evidence that the policy was strictly followed. 15 4 The Vantage
Point policy, although not strictly adhered to in that case, is an
ideal example of such a policy. Routing submissions directly to
a customer service or legal department with clear instructions
for their return is the most conclusive evidence a defendant can
offer to refute a plaintiff's claim of access, because it eliminates
any opportunity for creative employees to come into contact
with submissions.
By contrast, the routing policy in Novak did not insulate
the president of NBC from submissions. In fact, according to
testimony, they were forwarded to him. 155 There was also con-

flicting testimony regarding whether Tartikoff ever reviewed
outside submissions. 156 The flaw in the design of the company's
policy, combined with the lack of evidence showing that the
procedures were actually followed, should have led the court to
find a genuine issue of material fact rendering summary judgment inappropriate. To prevent companies from avoiding litigation by enacting sham policies in writing, courts must require
defendants to produce evidence that their policies not only effectively insulate decision-making employees in theory, but also
that they are strictly followed in practice. Mere denials of an
opportunity to copy, unsupported by evidence, are insufficient
to support a motion for summary judgment' 57
A policy such as the one at issue in Vantage Point may not
be feasible if the company is too small or lacks the rigid departmentalization such a policy presupposes. In these situations,
the rationale of bare corporate receipt is not applicable. If a
company is small enough or organized in such a way that it cannot implement a policy to prevent access among employees, the
barriers to a plaintiff's ability to establish a channel of communication between those employees are not as great.
Although not foolproof, consideration of routing policies in
summary judgment determinations will likely reduce litigation
and promote uniformity of result. Another effect, however,
may be an increased reluctance by businesses to consider any
154.

See NiMNER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.02[C], at 13-25 n.26.

155. Novak v. National Broadcasting Co., 752 F. Supp. 164, 169 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
156. Id at 169.
157. The moving party has an affirmative burden "to demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material facts .... His papers are carefully scrutinized; and those of the opposing party are the whole indulgently regarded."
MOORE ET AL., supra note 7, 56.3[14], at 529.
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outside submissions out of fear of exposing themselves to liability. While perhaps regrettable, many businesses may value
having clear choices. If a business chooses to reap the benefits
of talent from outside its organization, it will be held accountable for doing so; if it declines this opportunity, its policies will
protect it from protracted litigation.

B. EFFECT OF THE ADOPTION OF BARE CORPORATE RECEIPT
Maintaining a more lenient access requirement for summary judgment purposes does not have any substantial effect
on the likelihood of a plaintiff prevailing on the merits on the
issue of access. The plaintiff always retains the burden of proving that the alleged infringer had access to his work.1 5 8 At
trial, after cross-examination, the factfinder may decide that
the defendant's evidence is more credible and hold that the alleged infringer had no opportunity for access. A trial merely
ensures that if there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the alleged infringer had an opportunity to copy, the
factfinder can evaluate his credibility. 59
Nor does modification of the access standard help the
plaintiff with the other two components of copyright infringement, substantial similarity and independent creation. If the
plaintiff's work is not substantially similar to the allegedly infringing work, the defendant is entitled to summary judgWhile the access requirement may be bypassed
ment.160
entirely with a showing of striking similarity, 16 the converse is
not true. 62 Similarity is the dispositive element of an infringement claim because no amount of evidence of access will create
163
an inference of copying if there is not substantial similarity.
Additionally, even if plaintiffs can produce no evidence of ac158. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 12.11[D], at 12-161 (stating that
plaintiff must prove access); see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing the exception to this rule if the works are strikingly similar).
159. See MooRE ET AL., supra note 7, %56.3[15] ("[I]f credibility must be
weighed to decide factual disputes, summary judgment is inappropriate.");
Hartnick, supra note 22, at 55 ("[Summary judgment] should not apply to any
issue which cannot be resolved without observation of the demeanor of witnesses in order to evaluate their credibility.").
160. See NIMMER & NIMmER, supra note 6, § 13.03[A], at 13-27
("[S]ubstantial similarity between the plaintiff's and defendant's works is an
essential element of actionable copying.").
161. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
162. NnMNMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03[D], at 13-74.
163. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977); LATMAN, supra note 6, at 192.
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cess, courts still proceed to the similarity inquiry to determine
if the similarities are striking. 164 Striking similarity is a question of fact, 1 65 and is often thought to be ill-suited to disposition
by summary judgment.16 6 Reducing the plaintiff's burden as to
access, therefore, will be unlikely to have an effect on the issue
167
of similarity at the summary judgment stage.
164. See, e.g., Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th
Cir. 1978) (finding only a bare possibility of access, but proceeding to examine
similarity to determine if it is striking). Latman suggests that courts may dispose of some suits by addressing the substantial similarity issue first: "If a
finding for defendant is made on that issue, the court can avoid credibility issues arising from defendant's denial of copying...." Latman, supra note 27,
at 1211.
165. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1946).
166. This proposition was put forth by the court in Arnstein, which distrusted summary judgment in copyright infringement suits generally, see
supra note 59, but especially as to the issue substantial similarity. Judge
Frank advocated summary judgment only if the judge is able "to conclude that
the likenesses are so trifling that, on the issue of misappropriation, a trial
judge could legitimately direct a verdict for defendant." Arnstein, 154 F.2d at
473. Arnstein's holding on summary judgment is no longer good law. See
supra note 65. It remains influential, however, especially regarding the issue
of substantial similarity. See, e.g., Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 972 F.2d
939, 947 (8th Cir. 1992) (Lay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Lay argued that substantial similarity is a question of fact that should
go to the jury:
I have played the tape which contains the two musical compositions
and although I do not know the difference between be-bop, hip-hop,
and rock and roll, the tunes all sound the same to me. This may be
because I have no ear for music other than reflecting my generation's
preference for the more soothing rhythms of Glen Miller and Wayne
King or the sophisticated beat of Woody Herman playing the Wood
Chopper's Ball. Obviously judges have no expertise to resolve this
kind of question-which is why jurors should tell us whether a composite vote of reasonable minds can or cannot find similarity of
expression.
167. Several courts have stated that the amount of access required decreases proportionally with the amount of similarity shown. E.g., Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 329 F. Supp. 601, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The rationale
for allowing a reciprocal relationship between proof of access and similarity is
that copying, in cases where evidence is only circumstantial, is a question of
probabilities:
The point of the plaintiff's proof is to demonstrate that, in light of the
defendant's access to plaintiff's work and the similarities between the
two works, it is more probable than not that the defendant copied
from the plaintiff's work. Recognizing that the issue is one of
probabilities, courts have allowed strong similarities to compensate
for weak-or no-proof of access.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 7.2.1, at 8-9. It is not clear if the "Inverse Ratio
Rule" also applies-that is, a strong showing of access may compensate for a
weaker showing of similarity. Commentators seem to accept the rule. See
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 7.2.1, at 9 n.4 ("One need not accept.., that proof
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Second, if the defendant can produce evidence of independent creation, he will have successfully rebutted the inference of
copying created by plaintiff's evidence of access and similar-

ity.1 68 Copyright law only protects against unlawful copying of

the plaintiff's work. 169 If the defendant did not use plaintiff's
work in some way as a model for his own, there can be no finding of copying.170 Therefore, if the defendant can show that he
independently created the work in question, he is entitled to
summary judgment, irrespective of the amount of access
proven.1 71
Finally, a plaintiff, such as this Note's hypothetical struggling songwriter, must show access. To use the bare corporate
receipt doctrine, she first must show that her work was received by an employee of the allegedly infringing company. 72
of actual access will make a showing of similarities entirely unnecessary-to
accept the proposition that a strong showing of access can compensate for a
weaker showing of similarities .

. . .");

NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6,

§ 13.03[D], at 13-74 (noting that given the high degree of similarity required to
dispense with proof of access, the amount of similarity required where evidence of access is shown should be somewhat less than when there is no evidence of access). At least one court has rejected this notion altogether. See
Arc Music Corp. v. Lee, 296 F.2d 186, 187 (2d Cir. 1961). If courts in fact require proportionally less evidence of access with strong evidence of similarity,
they may also compensate for only limited evidence of access (such as when
plaintiffs can only show bare corporate receipt) by requiring more similarity.
168. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 24-25 and accompanying text.
170. See Latman, supra note 27, at 1189. The aims of copyright law and
patent law differ in this respect. "Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the
idea-not the idea itself ... The copyright protects originality rather than
novelty or invention . . .

."

Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954).

Although patent infringement can be established by an independent reproduction of the work in question, in copyright law, only outright plagiarism will
suffice. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275 (2d
Cir. 1936) (finding no copyright infringement where there had been no plagarism of a copyrighted work, even though independent reproduction may have
occurred). The example used to illustrate this difference is as follows:
[Two men, each a perfectionist, independently mak[e] maps of the
same territory. Though the maps are identical, each map may obtain
the exclusive right to make copies of his own particular map, and yet
neither will infringe the other's copyright.... Absent copying there
can be no infringement of copyright.
Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217-18.
171. See, e.g., Novak v. National Broadcasting Co., 752 F. Supp. 164, 170
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("If the Defendant's evidence can show.., independent creation[,] ...

access ...

is no longer an issue of material fact, as the Defendants

will have rebutted the prima facie case of copying.").
172. While this may seem automatic in copyright infringement suits, there
are cases in which plaintiff sues without even alleging receipt. See, e.g., Ben-
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If, through discovery, she has the good fortune to discover that
the person who received her work was in the same department
as, or a supervisor of, the employee who allegedly infringed her
work, she will be able to establish an opportunity to copy even
under the Meta-Film standard. 173 If instead she suspects that
the contents of her work were communicated through a less
formal employee relationship, she will most likely be unable to
produce evidence demonstrating the communication. Unless
bare corporate receipt is a possibility in her circuit, this inability to obtain evidence of access will prevent her suit from surviving summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
Proving access in copyright infringement claims can be a
difficult hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome when the person allegedly responsible for infringing the work is an employee of a
large company. The corporate receipt doctrine has the potential to offset the inherent disadvantage plaintiffs face when suing businesses for infringement. As courts look for ways to
reduce litigation in the area, they must be careful not to dismantle protections such as the corporate receipt doctrine, that
have the potential to give plaintiffs a fair opportunity in copyright suits.

son v. Coca-Cola Co., 795 F.2d 973 (11th Cir. 1986) (songwriter brought copyright action, without alleging that defendant had heard the song, received it, or
was even sent a copy of the song). In this case, the plaintiff sent his song to
several record companies, none of which included the defendant. Id. at 975.
One of plaintiff's theories of corporate receipt was that one of the record companies to whom he sent the song forwarded it to the defendant. Id. Plaintiff
also argued that defendant's songwriter could have heard the song at one of
defendant's performances. Id The court rejected this claim, finding that it
did not establish a reasonable possibility that defendant's writers could have
had access. Id
173. See Meta-Film Assocs. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346, 1355-56 (C.D.
Cal. 1984) (discussing the corporate receipt standard).

